Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute between Debra and Sidney Schutter (the Schutters) and the State of Montana Board of Land Commissioners (the Board) over the ownership of a water right, identified as Claim 13169. The Schutters use a groundwater well on their private property to irrigate four parcels of land, one of which is school trust land owned by the State of Montana. The Board objected to the Schutters' claim of exclusive ownership of the water right, asserting that the State holds an ownership interest in the portion of the water right used to irrigate the school trust land.The Montana Water Court granted summary judgment to the Board, adding the State as a co-owner of Claim 13169, but only for the portion of the claim appropriated to irrigate the school trust land. The Schutters appealed this decision, arguing that the Water Court erred in applying the precedent set in a previous case, Pettibone, and that no portion of Claim 13169 is appurtenant to the school trust land.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the Water Court's decision. The court held that the portion of Claim 13169 used to irrigate the school trust land is appurtenant to that land and, therefore, the State is a co-owner of that portion of the right. The court also rejected the Schutters' argument that the Water Court erred in applying the Pettibone precedent, stating that the Schutters' reliance on the point of diversion as singularly controlling was misplaced. The court concluded that the Schutters used the school trust land they leased to qualify for and establish the parameters of Claim 13169, and without the ability to claim a beneficial use on the school trust land, the Schutters' claim to a water right would have been different, perhaps smaller. View "Schutter v. Board of Land Commissioners" on Justia Law

Phoenix Capital Group Holdings, LLC, an oil and gas mineral rights investment firm, acquired mineral interests on two sections of real property in Richland County, Montana. The previous owner, Katherine Solis, had been approached multiple times by Kraken Oil and Gas LLC, an energy production company, to secure a lease of the mineral interests or to participate in drilling wells. Solis consistently refused to engage with Kraken. After Phoenix acquired the mineral interests, it expressed a desire to participate in the oil and gas production from the wells being drilled by Kraken. However, Kraken responded that the mineral interests had been deemed “non-consent” due to Solis’s lack of participation, and it was authorized to recover risk penalties.The Board of Oil and Gas Conservation of the State of Montana held a hearing and determined that Kraken had made unsuccessful, good faith attempts to acquire voluntary pooling in the spacing unit, and that Phoenix, as a successor in interest, was bound to Solis’s decision not to participate. The Board therefore determined that the mineral interests owned by Phoenix would be subject to forced pooling and that Kraken could recover risk penalties from Phoenix. Phoenix requested a rehearing from the Board, but that request was denied. Phoenix then filed a Complaint seeking injunctive relief from the Board decision in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County. The District Court issued an Order granting Kraken and the Board’s motions for summary judgment, and dismissing Phoenix’s Complaint.In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Phoenix appealed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the Board correctly interpreted the statutory force-pooling requirements, and that its decision to force pool Phoenix’s mineral interests was reasonable. The court also held that Kraken’s letters to Solis constituted written demands that gave Solis the option to either participate or face assessment of risk penalties. The court concluded that risk penalties were imposed, not pursuant to the presumption in § 82-11-202(3), MCA (2021), but under § 82-11-202(2), MCA, which requires an owner pay risk penalties when “after written demand, [the owner] has failed or refused to pay the owner’s share of the costs of development or other operations . . . .” View "Phoenix Capital v. Board of Oil & Gas" on Justia Law

The Greenwald Family Limited Partnership, a landowner in the Village of Mukwonago, Wisconsin, had a longstanding positive relationship with the Village, collaborating on several development projects. However, this relationship soured after a failed land deal in 2014 and several other conflicts. The Partnership sued the Village, alleging that it had been irrationally singled out for unfavorable treatment, violating its Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Partnership pointed to several adverse municipal decisions, focusing primarily on the failed land deal and a new road that was rerouted from the Partnership’s property.The case was initially filed in state court but was later removed to federal court. The district court concluded that the Village had a rational basis for its actions regarding the failed land deal, the new road, and other decisions affecting the Partnership’s properties. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the Village and relinquished jurisdiction over the state-law claims.The case was then brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court affirmed the district court's decision, stating that the Partnership had failed to show that the Village’s actions lacked any conceivable rational basis. The court found that the Village’s decisions were rationally related to its legitimate interests in promoting its land-use objectives and protecting public funds. The court concluded that the Partnership was a disappointed landowner, but not a victim of unconstitutional discrimination. View "Greenwald Family Limited Partnership v. Village of Mukwonago" on Justia Law

In September 2019, Eleticia Garcia hired Ponagansett 2 LLC, doing business as Peter Bibby Heating & Air, to perform mechanical work on her property. The parties signed two contracts, one for the installation of gas lines, water heaters, and boilers, and another for the installation of baseboards. However, Garcia failed to make the agreed-upon payments, leading Ponagansett to file a mechanics' lien against her property. When Garcia did not respond to the complaint, the Superior Court entered a default judgment in favor of Ponagansett.The Superior Court denied Garcia's subsequent motions to vacate the entry of default, to file a counterclaim out of time, to quash the mechanics' lien, and to file an oral proof of claim. Ponagansett then filed a motion for entry of default judgment against Garcia and a petition for attorneys' fees. The Superior Court granted Ponagansett's request to enforce the mechanics' lien, awarded Ponagansett $20,000 plus interest, and granted attorneys' fees of $12,310.27.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Garcia argued that the mechanics' lien was unenforceable because Ponagansett failed to provide notice of a possible mechanics' lien as required by law. She also contended that the decisions of the hearing justice to award Ponagansett the full payment of $20,000 and exclude the admission of a mechanical permit were reversible errors. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, holding that Garcia had waived her enforceability argument by failing to timely respond to Ponagansett's complaint. The court also found no error in the hearing justice's award of damages and exclusion of the mechanical permit. View "Ponagansett 2 LLC v. Eleticia Garcia" on Justia Law

In 2003, the City of Chicago contracted with Walsh Construction Company to manage the construction of a canopy and curtain wall system at O’Hare International Airport. Walsh subcontracted with LB Steel, LLC to fabricate and install steel columns to support the wall and canopy. Several years into the project, the City discovered cracks in the welds of the steel columns and sued Walsh for breaching its contract. Walsh, in turn, sued LB Steel under its subcontract. Walsh also asked LB Steel’s insurers to defend it in the City’s lawsuit, but they never did. Walsh eventually secured a judgment against LB Steel, which led it to declare bankruptcy. Walsh then sued LB Steel’s insurers to recover the costs of defending against the City’s suit and indemnification for any resulting losses.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff insurers on both issues. The court reasoned that, because the physical damage at issue was limited to LB Steel’s own products, it did not constitute “property damage” as that term appears in the policies, thereby precluding coverage. As for the duty to defend, the court determined that the Insurers had none, because the City’s underlying claims did not implicate potential coverage under LB Steel’s policies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the defects in the welds and columns do not constitute “property damage” under LB Steel’s commercial general liability (CGL) policies. The court also found that the insurers had no duty to defend Walsh in the City’s underlying suit. The court further affirmed the district court's denial of Walsh’s request for sanctions under § 155. View "St. Paul Guardian Insurance Company v. Walsh Construction Company" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the incorporation of the proposed City of St. George in Louisiana. The petition for incorporation was filed in 2018 and was approved by the governor, leading to a special election in which 54% of voters approved the incorporation. However, a legal challenge was filed by Baton Rouge’s Mayor-President and a Metropolitan Councilman, arguing that the petition for incorporation was deficient and that the proposed city would be unable to provide public services within a reasonable period of time. They also contended that the incorporation would have an adverse impact on Baton Rouge.The trial court denied the incorporation, finding that the petition minimally satisfied the statutory requirements and that the incorporation was unreasonable. The court found that St. George would operate at a deficit, affecting the timely provision of public services, and that lost tax revenue would significantly impact Baton Rouge. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of incorporation, finding the petition deficient as it failed to include a plan for the provision of services.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the lower courts erred in their calculations of St. George's operating costs and potential revenues. The court also found that the lower courts failed to consider the cost savings that would result from Baton Rouge no longer having to provide services to St. George. The court concluded that St. George could provide public services within a reasonable period of time and that the incorporation was reasonable. The court therefore rendered judgment in favor of the proponents of incorporation. View "BROOME VS. RIALS" on Justia Law

The case involves successors in interest of mineral-rights holders who sued in 2019 to declare a 1999 judgment foreclosing on their predecessors’ property for delinquent taxes as void. They argued that there was constitutionally inadequate notice of the foreclosure suit, rendering the foreclosure judgment and the tax sale that followed both void. The current owners sought traditional summary judgment based on the Tax Code’s command that an action relating to the title to property against the purchaser of the property at a tax sale may not be commenced later than one year after the date that the deed executed to the purchaser at the tax sale is filed of record.The trial court granted the current owners' motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. The majority held that the sheriff’s deed conclusively established the accrual date for limitations, so the burden shifted to the successors to adduce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a due-process violation that could render the statute of limitations inoperable. Because the successors relied only on their arguments and presented no evidence of a due-process violation, the majority concluded, the current owners were entitled to summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas held that under Draughon v. Johnson, the nonmovant seeking to avoid the limitations bar by raising a due-process challenge bears the burden to adduce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact about whether the underlying judgment is actually void for lack of due process. Because the nonmovant here adduced no such evidence, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment based on Section 33.54(a)(1). However, the court also noted that the law governing this case has undergone meaningful refinement since the summary-judgment proceedings took place. Given these recent and substantial developments in the relevant law, the court remanded this case to the trial court for further proceedings in the interest of justice. View "GILL v. HILL" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Good River Farms and Martin Marietta Materials and TXI Operations, who own land directly across from each other along the Colorado River. In 2015, a "120-year flood" event occurred near Austin, Texas, causing severe damage to Good River's pecan farm. Good River claimed that Martin Marietta's strip mining activities resulted in a large pit filled with groundwater that breached and released a deluge of impounded surface water onto their property. Following a jury trial, Good River was awarded $659,882.00 in damages, prevailing on claims for violations of Texas Water Code § 11.086 and for negligence. Martin Marietta appealed the decision.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The jury rejected Good River's nuisance claims but found in favor of Good River on the issues of water diversion and negligence. The trial court entered final judgment on that verdict, awarding Good River $659,882.00 in damages. Martin Marietta filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), which the trial court denied.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusions that Martin Marietta violated Texas Water Code § 11.086 and committed common law negligence. The court noted that the jury verdict demands deference and that the unique factual scenario presented in this case supported the jury's conclusions. View "Good River Farms v. TXI Operations" on Justia Law

The case involves T & C Construction Services and Theodore Miller (collectively, T & C), who operate a rental building in St. Albans, West Virginia. The City of St. Albans inspected the premises after a tenant reported a fire, revealing numerous fire hazards and building code violations. The City issued two citations for these violations, and the St. Albans Municipal Court fined T & C $81,250.00 for the fire code violations and $116,900.00 for the building code violations. After T & C failed to appeal these orders, the City sought enforcement in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County issued a cease-and-desist order that enjoined T & C from operating its rental business on the premises, granted the City a money judgment for the criminal fines, and appointed a special commissioner to sell the property to satisfy the judgment. T & C appealed this enforcement order to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision to grant injunctive relief, rejecting T & C’s challenges to the injunctive relief. The court found that the lower court had jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. However, the court reversed the lower court's appointment of a special commissioner to sell the property. The court held that the issuance and return of a writ of fieri facias showing “no property found” is a precondition to a circuit court’s jurisdiction to order the sale of a debtor’s property to satisfy a judgment for a criminal fine. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "T & C Construction Services, LLC v. City of St. Albans" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between two neighboring landowners, David W. Axelrod, as Trustee of the David W. Axelrod Family Trust, and Reid Limited Partnership (RLP), over real property and easement rights. Axelrod purchased a property in Teton County in 2003, which was not accessible by road. Michael Reid, who owned and operated an organic dairy farm on land owned by RLP, leased land adjacent to Axelrod's property. Axelrod built an access road through the RLP property, which led to a series of disputes between the parties. In 2017, Axelrod filed a lawsuit seeking clarification about his easement rights. The parties reached a settlement agreement, which required Axelrod to build a new road along a different easement and Reid to pay for the installation of a cattle guard. However, disagreements arose over the placement and cost of the cattle guard, leading to further litigation.The district court granted Axelrod's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Axelrod did not have an express easement for use of the RLP Easement, but he did have an easement by estoppel. The court also found that Reid had breached the settlement agreement by failing to pay for the cattle guard. Reid appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision in part and vacated it in part. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment against Reid and the dismissal of RLP's counterclaims for conversion and violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court also affirmed the judgment on Axelrod's breach of contract claim and the refusal to allow amendment of the pleadings to add Reid Family Limited Partnership as a party. However, the court vacated the dismissal of RLP's trespass claim and the award of attorney fees to Axelrod against RLP, remanding for further proceedings. View "Axelrod v. Reid Limited Partnership" on Justia Law