Justia Entertainment & Sports Law Opinion Summaries

Sydney Walton, a fourteen-year-old, suffered a concussion and other head injuries during an indoor soccer practice at a Baltimore County-owned facility. The plaintiffs, her family, alleged that the defendants, including Premier Soccer Club, Inc., its coach, and several Baltimore County employees, were negligent in violating a Maryland statute designed to ensure that parents, players, and coaches in youth sports are informed about the risks of concussions and best practices for preventing and handling them.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the negligence claim based on the statutory violation. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the alleged statutory violations proximately caused Sydney's injuries. The plaintiffs appealed, but the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court's decision, agreeing that the plaintiffs did not establish the necessary causation-in-fact.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. The court held that to establish a prima facie case of negligence based on a statutory violation, the plaintiff must show that the defendant violated a statute designed to protect a specific class of persons that includes the plaintiff and that the violation proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. The court emphasized that proximate cause requires evidence of both causation-in-fact and legal causation. The plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that the statutory violations were the cause-in-fact of Sydney's injuries, and thus, the summary judgment in favor of the defendants was upheld. View "Walton v. Premier Soccer Club" on Justia Law

David Katleski, an experienced golfer, was struck by an errant golf ball while participating in a tournament at Cazenovia Golf Club. The accident occurred during a "shotgun start" tournament, where players tee off simultaneously from different holes. Katleski was hit while searching for a ball on the seventh fairway by a ball hit from the third hole. He sued the golf club, alleging negligent design and operation of the course, particularly the placement of tee box A on the third hole.The Supreme Court denied the club's motion for summary judgment, finding a triable issue of fact regarding whether the course's design unreasonably enhanced the risk. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the club, emphasizing Katleski's experience and awareness of the course layout. The court found no evidence that the course design exposed Katleski to risks beyond those inherent in golf. Katleski appealed to the Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine precluded Katleski's negligence claim. The court found that being struck by a mishit golf ball is an inherent risk of the sport, and there was no evidence that the course design unreasonably enhanced this risk.Mary Galante was injured in a separate incident at Elma Meadows Golf Course when she collided with a car while driving a golf cart in the parking lot. The Appellate Division denied her motion to strike the County's primary assumption of risk defense and granted summary judgment to the County. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine did not apply as Galante was not participating in a protected athletic or recreational activity at the time of her injury. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for further consideration. View "Katleski v Cazenovia Golf Club, Inc." on Justia Law

High school athlete Hayden Halter was ejected from a varsity wrestling meet for unsportsmanlike conduct. The Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association (WIAA) has a rule requiring an athlete disqualified for unsportsmanlike conduct to serve a suspension at the next competitive event. Halter attempted to serve his suspension at a junior varsity event before the regional tournament, but the WIAA did not agree that this would satisfy the suspension. Halter and his father obtained a temporary restraining order in circuit court, allowing him to participate in regionals and eventually win the state championship. The litigation over his eligibility continued.The Racine County Circuit Court initially granted a temporary restraining order in favor of Halter, allowing him to compete. However, after further hearings, the circuit court ruled in favor of the WIAA. The court of appeals reversed this decision, leading to the WIAA petitioning for review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the WIAA acted reasonably in interpreting and applying its rules. The court found that the WIAA's interpretation of Rule 8(a), which required Halter to serve his suspension at the next varsity event, was reasonable and consistent with the rule's purpose of imposing real punishment for unsportsmanlike conduct. The court also found that the WIAA's appeal process, which did not allow for appeals of sport-specific season regulations, was reasonable and not arbitrary. Consequently, the court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, ruling in favor of the WIAA. View "Halter v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Apple Studios LLC offered Brent Sexton a film role on the condition that he get vaccinated. Sexton refused vaccination and sued Apple when it withdrew its offer and cast a different actor. Apple filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that its casting decision was protected activity in furtherance of free speech on public issues, including the vaccination controversy and the portrayal of a historical figure. The trial court denied Apple’s motion, finding that Apple’s interest in mandatory vaccination was not compelling and that Sexton had shown a probability of prevailing on his claims.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Apple’s anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that while Apple’s casting decision was protected activity, Sexton had demonstrated minimal merit in his claims. The court found that Apple’s interest in mandatory vaccination was not compelling and that Sexton had provided sufficient evidence to show he was qualified for the role with daily COVID-19 testing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that Apple’s casting decision was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute because it contributed to public discourse on vaccination policy and the portrayal of a historical figure. The court found that Sexton’s privacy claim failed because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy, and his discrimination claims failed because he was unqualified for the job due to his refusal to get vaccinated. The court granted Apple’s request for judicial notice and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Apple and for a determination of the fees and costs owed by Sexton to Apple. View "Sexton v. Apple Studios LLC" on Justia Law

Matthew Gee, a former University of Southern California (USC) football player, died in 2018 at age 49. The coroner attributed his death to the combined toxic effects of alcohol and cocaine, along with other health issues. His widow, Alana Gee, donated his brain to Boston University’s CTE Center, where it was determined he had Stage II Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE). Alana Gee filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), alleging that CTE was a substantial factor in her husband's death and that the NCAA negligently failed to take reasonable steps to reduce his risk of contracting CTE.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of the NCAA, finding that the assumption of risk doctrine applied. The jury concluded that the NCAA did not unreasonably increase the risks to Matthew Gee over and above those inherent in college football, nor did it unreasonably fail to take measures that would have minimized the risks without altering the essential nature of the sport. Alana Gee appealed the judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the assumption of risk doctrine and in refusing her proposed jury instruction on the liability of an unincorporated association for the acts of its members.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that the assumption of risk doctrine applied because repeated head hits are an inherent risk of college football. The court also found that any instructional error regarding the NCAA’s responsibility for the actions or inactions of its members was harmless. The court concluded that the NCAA did not have a duty to mitigate the inherent risks of the sport and that the failure to take additional safety measures did not increase those inherent risks. View "Gee v. National Collegiate Athletic Assocation" on Justia Law

AMW Investments, Inc. and Midwest Entertainment Ventures, Inc. (collectively, AMW) owned and operated an adult-entertainment venue called Theatre X. The Town of Clarksville revoked AMW’s adult-entertainment license in early 2019 due to violations of local ordinances against lewd conduct. AMW sought judicial review of the revocation in the Clark Circuit Court, which led to the Town filing counterclaims and seeking a preliminary injunction to bar AMW from operating Theatre X. The trial court issued the injunction and deferred ruling on fines pending AMW’s appeal of the injunction.The Clark Circuit Court ordered AMW to respond to the Town’s discovery requests, but AMW only objected on jurisdictional grounds, claiming the trial court lacked jurisdiction during the appeal. The trial court found AMW’s objections inexcusable and ordered compliance. AMW continued to object and withhold documents, leading the trial court to find AMW in contempt and impose a $30,000 sanction. AMW appealed the sanction, and the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding that AMW’s objections were not waived.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that AMW’s objections were untimely and thus waived. The Court affirmed the trial court’s discovery order and sanction, stating that the trial court did not lose jurisdiction during the appeal and no stay was issued. The Court emphasized that untimely objections are presumptively waived under the trial rules, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to excuse the waiver or in sanctioning AMW for non-compliance. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "AMW Investments Inc. v. The Town of Clarksville" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a group of professional models, alleged that the defendant, an adult entertainment nightclub, used their images in social media posts without consent to promote the club between August 2013 and November 2015. The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in 2021 in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming defamation and related torts. This filing was outside the three-year statute of limitations specified by Massachusetts law. To avoid dismissal, the plaintiffs argued for the application of the "discovery rule," which would delay the start of the limitations period until they knew or reasonably should have known about the harm.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts noted that the application of the discovery rule to social media posts was a novel issue in Massachusetts law. The court certified a question to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, asking under what circumstances material posted on social media platforms could be considered "inherently unknowable" for the purposes of applying the discovery rule in defamation and related tort claims.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that claims arising from social media posts accrue when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know they have been harmed by the publication. The court emphasized that the vastness of social media and the variability in access and searchability require a fact-specific inquiry. The court concluded that whether the plaintiffs knew or should have known about the harm must often be determined by the finder of fact. However, if the social media material is widely distributed and readily accessible and searchable, a judge may determine as a matter of law that the discovery rule does not apply. View "Davalos v. Bay Watch, Inc." on Justia Law

Henry Searcy, Jr. sought certification as an agent under the NFLPA’s 2012 Regulations Governing Contract Advisors but failed the required exam twice. After an arbitrator sided with the NFLPA, Searcy sued the NFLPA, its Executive Director, Prometric LLC, and Prometric’s Vice President and General Counsel. He alleged breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and sought vacatur of the arbitration award under the FAA.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against Prometric Defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and against the NFLPA Defendants for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against Prometric Defendants and instructed the District Court to reconsider its dismissal of claims against the NFLPA Defendants, specifically examining whether Section 301 of the LMRA preempted Searcy’s state law claims.Upon further review, the District Court concluded it had jurisdiction and dismissed the claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Searcy appealed again. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District Court erred in finding subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against the NFLPA Defendants. The court determined that Section 301 of the LMRA does not completely preempt Searcy’s state law claims, as these claims do not require interpretation of the NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal on different grounds and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). View "Searcy v. Smith" on Justia Law

The case involves a constitutional challenge to the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act of 2020 (“HISA”). The Act empowers a private corporation, the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (“Authority”), to create and enforce nationwide rules for thoroughbred horseracing. The plaintiffs, a group of horsemen's associations and other stakeholders in the horseracing industry, argued that the Act violated the private nondelegation doctrine, the Due Process Clause, the Appointments Clause, and the Tenth Amendment.The district court had previously held that an amendment to the Act, which gave the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) the power to abrogate, add to, or modify the Authority’s rules, cured the Act’s constitutional deficiencies. The district court also rejected claims that the Act violated the Constitution’s Appointments Clause and the Tenth Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that the FTC’s new rulemaking oversight meant the agency was no longer bound by the Authority’s policy choices, thereby resolving the nondelegation problem with the Authority’s rulemaking power. The court also agreed that the Act did not violate the Due Process Clause or the Appointments Clause.However, the court disagreed with the district court regarding the Act’s enforcement provisions. The court held that the Act’s enforcement provisions, which empowered the Authority to investigate, issue subpoenas, conduct searches, levy fines, and seek injunctions without the FTC’s approval, violated the private nondelegation doctrine. The court declared these enforcement provisions facially unconstitutional. The court also affirmed the district court’s finding that one of the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a Tenth Amendment challenge. View "National Horsemen’s Benevolent and Protective Association v. Black" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between the owners of El Gran Combo, one of the most popular Puerto Rican bands in history, and the band's former lead vocalist, Carlos Aponte-Cruz. The dispute centers on the interpretation of the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, which entitles the "recording artist or artists featured on [a] sound recording" to a 45% share of certain royalties that the recording generated. Aponte-Cruz argues that he is the "artist . . . featured" on certain El Gran Combo sound recordings for which he was the lead vocalist and is therefore entitled to his portion of the 45% share of the statutory royalties for those recordings. The owners of El Gran Combo, on the other hand, contend that the band as an independent entity distinct from any of its individual members is the "artist . . . featured" on those recordings.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico ruled in favor of the owners of El Gran Combo, finding that the band, as a distinct legal entity, was the group most prominently featured on the sound recordings and thus entitled to collect the royalties as the featured artist. The court also ruled that Rafael Ithier, as the sole owner of El Gran Combo, was entitled to collect the featured artist royalties due to the corporation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the District Court's ruling. The appellate court concluded that even though the covers for the El Gran Combo albums that contain the disputed recordings refer only to the band itself and not to any of its individual members, Aponte-Cruz, as a "recording artist . . . featured" on the recordings in dispute, is entitled to his portion of the 45% share of the statutory royalties for those recordings. The court found that neither EGC Corp. nor Ithier is entitled to the 45% royalty share in the recordings at issue. View "Ithier v. Aponte Cruz" on Justia Law