Justia Entertainment & Sports Law Opinion Summaries

Larry Nassar sexually assaulted hundreds of girls and young women during his involvement with USA Gymnastics (USAG), the non-profit organization which governs the sport in the United States. As a result of Nassar’s abuse, USAG has been sued several times and investigated by Congress and federal and state authorities. USAG sought financial help with its defense from insurers, including Liberty, with which USAG had a claims-made, directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance policy. An insurance-coverage lawsuit in Indiana state court was removed to federal court.The Nassar-related litigation and investigations forced USAG into bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court issued proposed findings and conclusions, including that the Nassar-related claims were timely made and that a wrongful-conduct exclusion applied to only those claims for which Nassar was criminally convicted. The district court agreed.The Seventh Circuit remanded, first holding that it had jurisdiction because the ruling had the “practical effect” of an injunction under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). USAG’s claims were timely made during the policy period. The wrongful conduct exclusion, which the court found ambiguous as applied to this case, applies to 10 instances of Nassar’s sexual abuse, but not to claims related to his abuse that were not finally adjudicated. A bodily injury exclusion in the policy does not preclude coverage; coverage is proper for various government investigations and other matters. View "USA Gymnastics v. Liberty Insurance Underwriter, Inc." on Justia Law

U.S. organized amateur hockey leagues come under the purview of USA Hockey, Inc., which is subject to the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. 220501–43. USA Hockey delegates most of its authority to state and regional affiliates. Since 1975, the Association has governed the sport in Illinois. Black Bear, which owns Illinois skating rinks, filed suit under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 2, alleging that the Association is monopolizing the sport. Black Bear does not claim to have paid monopoly prices, nor does it seek an order dissolving the Association and allowing free competition. It asked the district judge to order the Association to admit it as a member and permit it to sponsor a club and to pay damages for business losses suffered until these things occur. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The Sherman Act cannot be used to regulate cartels’ membership and profit-sharing. Members and potential members can enforce (or contest) its rules as a matter of state law, though a private group receives considerable leeway in the interpretation and application of those rules. View "Black Bear Sports Group, Inc. v. Amateur Hockey Association of Illinois, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants conduct online fantasy‐sports games. Participants pay an entry fee and select a roster, subject to a budget cap that prevents every entrant from picking only the best players. Results from real sports contests determine how each squad earns points to win cash. Former college football players whose names, pictures, and statistics have been used without their permission sued, claiming that Indiana’s right-of-publicity statute, Code 32‐36‐1‐8, gives them control over the commercial use of their names and data. The district court dismissed the complaint, relying on exemptions for the use of a personality’s name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive appearance, gestures, or mannerisms "in" material “that has political or newsworthy value” or “in connection with the broadcast or reporting of an event or a topic of general or public interest." The Seventh Circuit affirmed after the Supreme Court of Indiana responded to a certified question that: Indiana’ right of publicity statute contains an exception for material with newsworthy value that includes online fantasy sports operators’ use of college players’ names, pictures, and statistics for online fantasy contests. View "Daniels v. Fanduel, Inc." on Justia Law

Deppe, a punter, enrolled at Northern Illinois University (NIU), a National Collegiate Athletic Association Division I school, in 2014 without an athletic scholarship. Deppe decided to “red shirt” his first year; he practiced with the team but did not compete, so the clock did not run on his four years of NCAA athletic eligibility. In 2015 NIU signed another punter, so he looked for a new program. Coaches at the University of Iowa, another Division I school, told Deppe they wanted him if he would be eligible to compete during the 2016–2017 season. The NCAA indicated that under its year-in-residence rule, Deppe would be ineligible to compete for one year following his transfer. An exception permitting a one-time transfer with immediate athletic eligibility in limited circumstances was unavailable to Deppe. A player who transfers under extenuating circumstances may obtain a waiver of the NCAA’s requirement that a student’s four years of playing time be completed in five calendar years; the school to which he transfers must initiate the process. Iowa's football staff notified Deppe that the team had decided to pursue another punter who had immediate eligibility and would not initiate the process for him. Deppe sued the NCAA on behalf of himself and a proposed class alleging violations of the Sherman Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The year-in-residence requirement is an eligibility rule clearly meant to preserve the amateur character of college athletics, is therefore presumptively procompetitive, and need not be tested for anticompetitive effect under a full rule-of-reason analysis. View "Deppe v. National Collegiate Athletic Association" on Justia Law

Derek Boogaard was a professional hockey player with the Minnesota Wild. Team doctors repeatedly prescribed Derek pain pills for injuries. He became addicted. In 2009 the NHL placed Derek into its Substance Abuse and Behavioral Health Program. Derek was checked into a rehabilitation facility and was later subject to a mandatory “Aftercare Program,” which required him to refrain from using opioids and Ambien and to submit to random drug testing. Derek joined the New York Rangers in 2010 and began asking trainers for Ambien. Derek relapsed. NHL doctors made Derek’s situation worse by violating multiple conditions of the Aftercare Program. Eventually, Derek overdosed and died. Derek’s estate sued, alleging that the NHL had failed to prevent the over-prescription of addictive medications, had breached its voluntarily undertaken duty to monitor Derek’s drug addiction, was negligent in monitoring Derek for brain trauma, and negligently permitted team doctors to inject Derek with an intramuscular analgesic. The court found some of the claims, founded on the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, were preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act and granted the NHL summary judgment. A second amended complaint was dismissed on grounds that Minnesota law applied and required a wrongful-death action to be brought by a court-appointed trustee. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Boogaards had forfeited their claims by failing to respond to the NHL’s argument that the complaint failed to state a claim under the law of any state. View "Boogaard v. National Hockey League" on Justia Law

FanDuel and DraftKings conduct online fantasy‐sports games. Participants pay an entry fee and select a roster, subject to a budget cap that prevents every entrant from picking only the best players. Results from real sports contests determine how each squad earns points to win cash. Former college football players whose names, pictures, and statistics have been used without their permission sued, claiming that Indiana’s right-of-publicity statute, Code 32‐36‐1‐8, gives them control over the commercial use of their names and data. The district court dismissed the complaint, relying on exemptions for the use of a personality’s name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive appearance, gestures, or mannerisms "in" material “that has political or newsworthy value” or “in connection with the broadcast or reporting of an event or a topic of general or public interest." The Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Supreme Court of Indiana: Whether online fantasy‐sports operators that condition entry on payment, and distribute cash prizes, need the consent of players whose names, pictures, and statistics are used in the contests, in advertising the contests, or both. Plaintiffs’ details on the websites are not necessarily “in” newsworthy “material” or a form of “reporting” and there is no state law precedent interpreting a statute similar to Indiana’s. The Supreme Court of Indiana may consider not only the statutory text but also plaintiffs’ arguments about the legality of defendants’ fantasy games and the possibility of an extra-textual illegal‐activity exception. View "Daniels v. Fanduel, Inc." on Justia Law

FanDuel and DraftKings conduct online fantasy‐sports games. Participants pay an entry fee and select a roster, subject to a budget cap that prevents every entrant from picking only the best players. Results from real sports contests determine how each squad earns points to win cash. Former college football players whose names, pictures, and statistics have been used without their permission sued, claiming that Indiana’s right-of-publicity statute, Code 32‐36‐1‐8, gives them control over the commercial use of their names and data. The district court dismissed the complaint, relying on exemptions for the use of a personality’s name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive appearance, gestures, or mannerisms "in" material “that has political or newsworthy value” or “in connection with the broadcast or reporting of an event or a topic of general or public interest." The Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Supreme Court of Indiana: Whether online fantasy‐sports operators that condition entry on payment, and distribute cash prizes, need the consent of players whose names, pictures, and statistics are used in the contests, in advertising the contests, or both. Plaintiffs’ details on the websites are not necessarily “in” newsworthy “material” or a form of “reporting” and there is no state law precedent interpreting a statute similar to Indiana’s. The Supreme Court of Indiana may consider not only the statutory text but also plaintiffs’ arguments about the legality of defendants’ fantasy games and the possibility of an extra-textual illegal‐activity exception. View "Daniels v. Fanduel, Inc." on Justia Law

A.H. is a member of Evanston High School’s track and field team despite having spastic quadriplegia related to cerebral palsy. A.H. is considered an elite athlete within the disabled athletic community. He requested that the Illinois High School Association (IHSA) create a separate division with different time standards for para‐ambulatory runners in the Sectional and State championship track meets. The IHSA has implemented events and divisions within particular sports for disabled student‐athletes but does not have a para‐ambulatory division for track and field meets. While the IHSA does not organize or regulate individual school meets, it manages the most important track meets. The IHSA denied A.H.’s requests. A.H. sued under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12182(a). The district court granted the IHSA summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There is no reason to believe that disabled runners have been unable to attain the qualifying times simply “by reason of” or “on the basis of” their disability. Disabled runners would likely not meet the qualifying times even if they were not disabled. A.H. seeks an accommodation that would make him competitive and allow him to achieve results he currently cannot achieve. The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA do not require the IHSA to alter the fundamental nature of their events; A.H.’s accommodation requests are unreasonable as a matter of law. View "A.H. v. Illinois High School Association" on Justia Law

Rooftops sells tickets to view Cubs games and other events at Wrigley Field from the roofs of buildings it controls. Chicago has an ordinance allowing the rooftop businesses. Before the 2002 season, the Cubs installed a windscreen above the outfield bleachers, obstructing the views from rooftop businesses and sued Rooftops, claiming misappropriation of Cubs’ property by charging fees to watch games.The parties settled by entering into the License Agreement running through 2023. Rooftops agreed to pay the Cubs 17% of their gross revenues in exchange for views into Wrigley Field. The Agreement contemplated Wrigley Field's expansion. In 2013, the Cubs released a mock‐up of its proposed renovation, showing that rooftop businesses would be largely blocked by the construction. The city approved the plan over objections. Rooftops claimed that Cubs’ representatives used the threat of blocking views and other “strong-arm tactics” as leverage to force a sale, and sued, alleging: attempted monopolization; false and misleading commercial representations, defamation, false light, and breach of the non‐disparagement provision; and breach of contract. The court denied Rooftops’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed its dismissal of monopolization claims because Major League Baseball’s antitrust exemption applies; Rooftops failed to establish a plausible relevant market; and the Cubs cannot be limited by antitrust law from distributing their own product. The contract's plain language did not limit expansions to Wrigley Field's seating capacity. View "Right Field Rooftops, LLC v. Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Indianapolis Colts NFL professional football team established an online marketplace for owners of season tickets to transfer their season ticket rights upon payment of a fee equal to 30 percent of the sale price of the tickets. Frager bought 94 season tickets in 2015, believing that he would be able to renew those season tickets in 2016. The Colts refused to give him season tickets for 2016. He sued, claiming conversion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. A season-ticket holder has no right to future season tickets unless the Colts sold them that right in the first place, and the Colts ticket contract forecloses that possibility. Frager had a reasonable expectation that he would be able to renew his season tickets for 2016. The fact that purchasers of season tickets are willing to pay a 30 percent transfer fee in the online marketplace indicates that the expectation of renewal added to the salable value of season tickets, but given the wording of his contract with the Colts it was merely “a speculation on a chance, not a legal right.” View "Frager v. Indianapolis Colts, Inc." on Justia Law