Justia Entertainment & Sports Law Opinion Summaries
Balow v. Michigan State University
Before the end of the 2019–20 academic year, MSU had several Division I sports teams: men’s baseball, basketball, cross country, football, golf, ice hockey, soccer, swimming and diving, tennis, track and field, and wrestling; and women’s basketball, cross country, field hockey, golf, gymnastics, rowing, soccer, softball, swimming and diving, tennis, track and field, and volleyball. In October 2020, MSU announced it would no longer sponsor the men’s and women’s swimming-and-diving teams after the 2020–21 school year. During the 2019–20 school year, the teams had 29 men and 33 women. Women student-athletes sought a preliminary injunction to prevent MSU from eliminating the women’s swimming-and-diving team, arguing that MSU failed to provide women with substantially proportionate athletic opportunities, as required by Title IX. In the 2018–19 school year, 48.8% of undergraduate students were male and 51.2% were female; and, in the 2019–20 school year, 49.1% were male and 50.9% were female.The district court denied a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their Title IX claim. The Sixth Circuit vacated, first finding that MSU did not inflate its number of women athletes. The correct inquiry focuses on the number of participation opportunities, not the gap as a percentage of the athletic program. . A school may fail to achieve substantial proportionality even if its participation gap is only a small percentage of the size of its athletic program View "Balow v. Michigan State University" on Justia Law
Mayes v. La Sierra Univ.
In 2018, plaintiff-appellant Monica Mayes was struck in the face by a foul ball while attending an intercollegiate baseball game between two private universities, Marymount University (Marymount) and defendant-respondent La Sierra University (La Sierra). Mayes suffered skull fractures and brain damage, among other injuries. When struck by the foul ball, Mayes was seated in a grassy area along the third-base line, behind the dugout, which extended eight feet above the ground, and there was no protective netting above the dugout. Mayes sued La Sierra for her injuries, alleging a single cause of action for negligence for its failure to: (1) install protective netting over the dugouts; (2) provide a sufficient number of screened seats for spectators; (3) warn spectators that the only available screened seats were in the area behind home plate; and (4) exercise crowd control in order to remove distractions in the area along the third-base line that diverted spectators’ attention from the playing field. La Sierra moved for summary judgment, claiming that the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred Mayes’s negligence claim. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, observing that the case was “a textbook primary assumption of the risk case.” To this, the Court of Appeal reversed, finding La Sierra did not meet its burden of showing that the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred Mayes’s negligence claim. In addition, Mayes showed there were triable issues of material fact concerning whether La Sierra was negligent for the reasons she alleged in her complaint. View "Mayes v. La Sierra Univ." on Justia Law
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders
The City of Oakland sued the NFL and its member teams, alleging that the defendants created artificial scarcity in their product (NFL teams), and used that scarcity to demand supra-competitive prices from host cities. The city alleged that when it could not pay those prices, the defendants punished it by allowing the Raiders to move to Las Vegas.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. While the city had Article III standing because it plausibly alleged that, but for the defendants’ conduct, it would have retained the Raiders, the defendants’ conduct did not amount to an unreasonable restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The city failed sufficiently to allege a group boycott, which occurs when multiple producers refuse to sell goods or services to a particular customer, alleging only that a single producer, the Raiders, refused to deal with it. The city also failed sufficiently to allege statutory standing on a theory that the defendants’ conduct constituted an unlawful horizontal price-fixing scheme. A finding of antitrust standing requires balancing the nature of the plaintiff’s alleged injury, the directness of the injury, the speculative measure of the harm, the risk of duplicative recovery, and the complexity in apportioning damages; here, the city was priced out of the market and was a nonpurchaser. Any damages were highly speculative and would be exceedingly difficult to calculate. View "City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders" on Justia Law
Portz v. St. Cloud State University
For budget reasons, St. Cloud State University shut down six of its sports teams, including women's tennis and Nordic Skiing teams. Female student-athletes brought a Title IX discrimination action. 20 U.S.C. 1681(a). The district court preliminarily enjoined cutting the women's teams, concluding the University failed to comply with Title IX requirements in its allocation of athletic participation opportunities and treatment and benefits for student-athletes.The Eighth Circuit reversed in part and remanded. The court upheld findings that the University uses a tier system for dividing particular teams, offering different levels of support to each tier. The University violated Title IX by not providing equitable participation opportunities for men and women. The district court erred, however, by requiring the University to provide equitable treatment and benefits “among the tiers of support,” and by mandating steps toward eliminating the unequal distribution of “participation opportunities among the tiers” rather than analyzing the institution's programs as a whole. View "Portz v. St. Cloud State University" on Justia Law
Mitchell v. Twin Galaxies, LLC
Mitchell sued Twin Galaxies for defamation and false light after Twin Galaxies issued a statement asserting Mitchell’s world record scores in the Donkey Kong arcade game were not achieved on original unmodified hardware as required under its rules. Twin Galaxies removed all of Mitchell’s world record scores and banned him from participating in its leaderboards. The trial court denied Twin Galaxies’ special motion to strike under the strategic lawsuits against public participation statute (anti-SLAPP motion). (Code Civ. Procedure 425.16.) The court of appeal affirmed. Mitchell showed a probability of prevailing on his claims; the trial court properly denied the anti-SLAPP motion. Mitchell made a prima facie showing of falsity by providing his own declaration and others’ declarations attesting to the equipment used and made a prima facie showing of actual malice. Twin Galaxies failed to take any steps to inquire into the truth of Mitchell’s statements even after he was provided the names of witnesses and having confirmation of the procedures under which the disputed scores were achieved. View "Mitchell v. Twin Galaxies, LLC" on Justia Law
In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Ohio Power Siting Board granting Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need to construct, operate, and maintain a natural-gas pipeline, holding that the Board's decision was not manifestly against the weight of the evidence and was not so clearly unsupported by the record as to show a mistake or willful disregard of duty.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) assuming without deciding that the Board misapplied its filing requirements, the error was harmless; (2) the Board did not err in determining that Duke's proposal met the conditions of Ohio Rev. Code 4906.10(A)(1); (3) the Board properly accounted for the interest of safety in evaluating Duke's proposal; (4) the Board did not err by not requiring Duke to evaluate the pipeline's impact against the City of Blue Ash's most recent comprehensive plan; (5) the Board did not err in evaluating the pipeline's estimated tax benefits; and (6) the Board did not deprive Blue Ash of due process of law. View "In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law
Landis v. WashingtonvState Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12182(a), the Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated 1991Accessibility Guidelines requiring that in sports stadiums, “[w]heelchair areas shall be an integral part of any fixed seating plan and shall be provided so as to provide people with physical disabilities a choice of admission prices and lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general public.” A 1996 DOJ guidance document (Accessible Stadiums) provides: Wheelchair seating locations must provide lines of sight comparable to those provided to other spectators. In stadiums where spectators can be expected to stand during the show or event (for example, football, baseball, basketball games, or rock concerts), all or substantially all of the wheelchair seating locations must provide a line of sight over standing spectators."Plaintiffs, baseball fans with ADA-qualifying disabilities, use wheelchairs for mobility. The Stadium, designed in 1996 and constructed in 1997-1999, has vertically stacked seating levels sloped toward the field. There is wheelchair-accessible seating on each level. The district court rejected Plaintiffs’ sightline claim and, regarding the Accessible Stadiums standard, concluded: [W]hen the Court reviews the illustrations considering what can be seen over the line representing the standing spectator’s shoulders, i.e., “over the shoulders and between the heads,” more of the field is visible from the accessible seat, making the views comparable." The Ninth Circuit vacated. The district court failed to explain how the Stadium satisfies all the Accessible Stadiums requirements. View "Landis v. WashingtonvState Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District" on Justia Law
LeBrun v. CBS Studios Inc.
In 2017, a scene depicting an armed robbery of a jewelry store was filmed in New Orleans for the CBS television show, NCIS: New Orleans. No permits were obtained for the filming and police were not informed. A neighbor, thinking the robbery was real, called 911. The plaintiffs, all Louisiana residents, were arrested by responding officers and later released. They sought to recover damages in California from CBS, based upon fraudulent representations and/or omissions that were made to them in Louisiana, and that caused them harm in Louisana.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Code of Civil Procedure section 361 provides that “[w]hen a cause of action has arisen in another State, . . . and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained against him in this State.” The one-year Louisiana statute of limitations expired before the filing of the action. The court rejected arguments that the causes of action arose in California because the fraud committed in Louisiana allegedly was ratified by CBS’s conduct in California. The plaintiffs cannot state a valid claim for unjust enrichment. View "LeBrun v. CBS Studios Inc." on Justia Law
Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.
When an AM/FM radio station plays a song over the air, it does not pay public performance royalties to the owner of the original sound recording. Digital and satellite radio providers like Sirius, however, must pay public performance royalties whenever they broadcast post-1972 music. Before a 2018 amendment to the copyright law, 17 U.S.C. 1401(b), they did not have to pay royalties for playing pre-1972 music under federal law. State law was less clear.The district court held that California law, which grants copyright owners an “exclusive ownership” to the music, creates a right of public performance for owners of pre-1972 sound recordings and that Sirius must pay for playing pre-1972 music. The Ninth Circuit reversed, looking to the common law in the 19th century when California first used the phrase “exclusive ownership” in its copyright statute. At that time, no state had recognized a right of public performance for music, and California protected only unpublished works. Nothing suggests that California upended this deeply-rooted common-law understanding of copyright protection when it used the word “exclusive ownership” in its copyright statute in 1872, so “exclusive ownership” does not include the right of public performance. View "Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc." on Justia Law
Khodorkovskaya v. Gay
Inna Khodorkovskaya sued the director and the playwright of Kleptocracy, a play that ran for a month in 2019 at the Arena Stage in Washington, D.C. She alleged false light invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Inna, who was a character in Kleptocracy, alleges that the play falsely depicted her as a prostitute and murderer. Inna’s husband was persecuted because of his opposition to Vladimir Putin; the two obtained asylum in the U.K.The district court dismissed her complaint, reasoning that Kleptocracy is a fictional play, even if inspired by historical events, and that the play employed various dramatic devices underscoring its fictional character so that no reasonable audience member would understand the play to communicate that the real-life Inna was a prostitute or murderer. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. “Kleptocracy is not journalism; it is theater. It is, in particular, a theatrical production for a live audience, a genre in which drama and dramatic license are generally the coin of the realm.” The play’s use of a fictional and metaphorical tiger, of Vladimir Putin reciting poetry, and of a ghost reinforce to the reasonable audience member that the play’s contents cannot be taken literally. View "Khodorkovskaya v. Gay" on Justia Law