Justia Entertainment & Sports Law Opinion Summaries

Cartoon Network provides a free mobile application for smartphones called the CN app. After plaintiff downloaded the free app, the Cartoon Network kept records of the videos he watched and shared those records with Bango without his consent. Bango specializes “in tracking individual behaviors across the Internet and mobile applications . . . [and claims] that its technology ‘reveals customer behavior, engagement and loyalty across and between all [ ] websites and apps.’” Plaintiff filed suit against Cartoon Network under the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2710, alleging that he was a “subscriber” of Cartoon Network and therefore a “consumer” under the Act. Plaintiff further claimed that Cartoon Network violated the Act when it disclosed his “personally identifiable information” to Bango. The district court granted Cartoon Network's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that a person who downloads and uses a free mobile application on his smartphone to view freely available content, without more, is not a “subscriber” (and therefore not a “consumer”) under the VPPA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ellis v. The Cartoon Network, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal involves a dispute over the copyright in the musical composition “Santa Claus is Comin’ to Town." Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a declaration that either a notice of termination served on EMI in 2007 or another such notice served in 2012 will, upon becoming effective, terminate EMI’s rights in the Song. The district court granted summary judgment to EMI, holding that its rights in the Song will subsist through the entire remaining copyright term - which, under current law, is scheduled to expire in 2029 - pursuant to a 1951 agreement that plaintiffs are powerless to terminate. The court concluded, however, that EMI owns its rights in the Song not under the 1951 Agreement but instead under a subsequent contract executed in 1981; and that the 2007 Termination Notice will terminate the 1981 Agreement in 2016.  Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment in their favor. The court reversed and remanded. View "Baldwin v. EMI Feist Catalog, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a professional basketball team in the NBA, filed an unverified petition for a writ of review against the Appeals Boards and others, challenging what it refers to as the Appeals Board's jurisdiction over a claim for accumulated injuries by Durand Macklin, a former professional basketball player in the NBA, for cumulative injuries. Petitioner contends that, in view of Macklin's contact with California, application of California workers' compensation law in this case would not be reasonable and thus would be a denial of due process. The court held that Labor Code section 5954 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1069 require verification of a petition to review a decision of the Appeals Board. After oral argument, the court granted petitioner's request to file a verified petition. On the merits, the court held that California has a legitimate interest in an industrial injury when the applicant was employed by a California corporation and participated in other games and practices in California for non-California NBA teams, during the period of exposure causing cumulative injury. Therefore, subjecting petitioner to California workers' compensation law is reasonable and not a denial of due process. The court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Board. View "N.Y. Knickerbockers v. WCAB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff O'Bannon filed suit against the NCAA and CLC, alleging that the NCAA’s amateurism rules, insofar as they prevented student-athletes from being compensated for the use of their names, images, and likenesses (NILs), were an illegal restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Plaintiff Keller filed suit against the NCAA, CLC, and EA, alleging that EA had impermissibly used student-athletes’ NILs in its video games and that the NCAA and CLC had wrongfully turned a blind eye to EA’s misappropriation of these NILs. Both cases were consolidated. The district court entered judgment for plaintiffs, concluding that the NCAA’s rules prohibiting student-athletes from receiving compensation for their NILs violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court concluded that it was not precluded from reaching the merits of the appeal and found none of plaintiffs' claims persuasive. The court reaffirmed that NCAA regulations are subject to antitrust scrutiny and must be analyzed under the Rule of Reason; when those regulations truly serve procompetitive purposes, courts should not hesitate to uphold them; but the NCAA is not above the antitrust laws, and courts cannot and must not shy away from requiring the NCAA to play by the Sherman Act’s rules. In this case, the NCAA’s rules have been more restrictive than necessary to maintain its tradition of amateurism in support of the college sports market. The court concluded that the Rule of Reason requires that the NCAA permit its schools to provide up to the cost of attendance to their student athletes. The court concluded that it does not require more. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court’s judgment and permanent injunction insofar as they require the NCAA to allow its member schools to pay student-athletes up to $5,000 per year in deferred compensation. The court affirmed otherwise. View "O'Bannon v. NCAA" on Justia Law

Fans of the musical group Insane Clown Posse, who call themselves “Juggalos,” frequently display, on person or property, insignia representative of the band. In 2011, the National Gang Intelligence Center—an informational center operating under the Federal Bureau of Investigation—released a congressionally-mandated report on gang activity that included a section on Juggalos. The report identified Juggalos as a “hybrid gang” and relayed information about criminal activity committed by Juggalo subsets. Juggalos allege that they subsequently suffered violations of their First and Fifth Amendment constitutional rights at the hands of state and local law enforcement officers who were motivated to commit the injuries in question due to the identification of Juggalos as a criminal gang. They filed suit against the Department of Justice and FBI under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The SIxth Circuit reversed dismissal for lack of standing. The Juggalos sufficiently alleged that the reputational harm and chill was caused by the 2011 Report and, where reputational harm and chill will likely be alleviated by the relief sought, redressability exists. View "Parsons v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

After receiving takedown notification, YouTube removed plaintiff's video and sent her an email notifying her of the removal. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against Universal under part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. 512(f), alleging that Universal misrepresented in the takedown notification that her video constituted an infringing use of a portion of a composition by the Artist known as Prince, which Universal insists was unauthorized by the law. The court held that the DMCA requires copyright holders to consider fair use before sending a takedown notification, and that failure to do so raises a triable issue as to whether the copyright holder formed a subjective good faith belief that the use was not authorized by law. The court held, contrary to the district court's holding, that plaintiff may proceed under an actual knowledge theory in order to determine whether Universal knowingly misrepresented that it had formed a good faith belief that the video did not constitute fair use. The court held that the willful blindness doctrine may be used to determine whether a copyright holder "knowingly materially misrepresented[ed]" that it held a "good faith belief" the offending activity was not a fair use. In this case, plaintiff failed to provide evidence from which a juror could infer that Universal was aware of a high probability the video constituted fair use. Therefore, plaintiff may not proceed to trial on a willful blindness theory. The court also held that a plaintiff may seek recovery of nominal damages for an injury incurred as a result of a section 512(f) misrepresentation. In this case, plaintiff may seek recovery of nominal damages due to an unquantifiable harm suffered as a result of Universal’s actions. View "Lenz. Universal Music Corp." on Justia Law

The 1992 Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 28 U.S.C. 3701, provides: It shall be unlawful for a governmental entity to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize or for a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity, a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more performances of such athletes in such games. PASPA exempts state-sponsored sports wagering in Nevada and sports lotteries in Oregon and Delaware, and had an exception for New Jersey if New Jersey were to enact a sports gambling scheme within one year of PASPA’s enactment. New Jersey did not do so. After voters approved a sports-wagering constitutional amendment, New Jersey enacted the Sports Wagering Act in 2012, providing for sports wagering at casinos and racetracks, under a comprehensive regulatory scheme. Sports leagues sued to enjoin the 2012 Law.The district court held that PASPA was constitutional and enjoined implementation of the 2012 Law. The Third Circuit affirmed. PASPA, by its terms, prohibits states from authorizing by law sports gambling, and the 2014 Law does exactly that. View "Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of N.J." on Justia Law

Dennis Rodebaugh ran D&S Guide and Outfitters. Rodebaugh took mostly out-of-state clients on elk and deer hunts in the White River National Forest near Meeker, where they waited in tree stands for elk and deer to approach before shooting them. To attract the elk and deer, Rodebaugh spread salt around the base of the tree stands. Colorado law prohibited “baiting.” And selling wildlife taken in violation of state law is a federal crime under the Lacey Act. After an extensive investigation, Rodebaugh was indicted for several Lacey Act violations. A jury found him guilty on six counts. The district court sentenced him to 41 months in prison and three years of supervised release. He appealed, raising various trial and sentencing issues. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and prison sentence, rejecting Rodebaugh’s challenges to the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, the validity of the underlying Colorado regulations, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction on each count, and the application of enhancements to the base offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Rodebaugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff produced the motion picture The Merry Gentleman, which was released in 2009. Despite some critical acclaim, the film was a commercial flop, for which the plaintiff blames Michael Keaton, the film’s lead actor and director. It filed a breach of contract action against Keaton and Keaton’s “loan-out company” that he uses for professional contracting, alleging that Keaton failed to timely prepare the first cut of the film; submitted an incomplete first cut; submitted a revised cut that was not ready to watch; communicated directly with Sundance Film Festival and threatened to boycott the festival if it did not accept his director’s cut instead of the producers’ preferred cut; failed to cooperate with the producers during the post-production process; and failed to promote the film. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Keaton, agreeing that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that Keaton’s alleged breaches caused the damages sought: all $5.5 million spent producing the movie. View "Merry Gentleman, LLC v. George & Leona Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

The Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department participated in a reality television program, The Shift. The film crew followed homicide detectives investigating a deadly 2008 home invasion. Police eventually arrested Hart, in the final episode of the program’s first season. After Hart spent nearly two years in jail awaiting trial, the charges were dismissed. The Shift’s audience was not informed. Hart sued detectives and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he was arrested without probable cause and that the lead detective made false or misleading statements in her probable cause affidavit for his arrest. The court rejected all claims before trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but noted “many troubling aspects of IMPD’s investigation, and this case should warn police departments about having their detectives moonlight as television stars.” A reasonable trier of fact could not find that police lacked probable cause to arrest Hart. Nor could a reasonable jury find that the lead detective made false or misleading statements in her affidavit. Four surviving witnesses from the home invasion separately identified Hart as one of the men who attacked them. None of the police had any reason to doubt these identifications when they arrested Hart. View "Hart v. Mannina" on Justia Law