Justia Entertainment & Sports Law Opinion Summaries

Dennis Rodebaugh ran D&S Guide and Outfitters. Rodebaugh took mostly out-of-state clients on elk and deer hunts in the White River National Forest near Meeker, where they waited in tree stands for elk and deer to approach before shooting them. To attract the elk and deer, Rodebaugh spread salt around the base of the tree stands. Colorado law prohibited “baiting.” And selling wildlife taken in violation of state law is a federal crime under the Lacey Act. After an extensive investigation, Rodebaugh was indicted for several Lacey Act violations. A jury found him guilty on six counts. The district court sentenced him to 41 months in prison and three years of supervised release. He appealed, raising various trial and sentencing issues. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and prison sentence, rejecting Rodebaugh’s challenges to the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, the validity of the underlying Colorado regulations, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction on each count, and the application of enhancements to the base offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Rodebaugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff produced the motion picture The Merry Gentleman, which was released in 2009. Despite some critical acclaim, the film was a commercial flop, for which the plaintiff blames Michael Keaton, the film’s lead actor and director. It filed a breach of contract action against Keaton and Keaton’s “loan-out company” that he uses for professional contracting, alleging that Keaton failed to timely prepare the first cut of the film; submitted an incomplete first cut; submitted a revised cut that was not ready to watch; communicated directly with Sundance Film Festival and threatened to boycott the festival if it did not accept his director’s cut instead of the producers’ preferred cut; failed to cooperate with the producers during the post-production process; and failed to promote the film. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Keaton, agreeing that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that Keaton’s alleged breaches caused the damages sought: all $5.5 million spent producing the movie. View "Merry Gentleman, LLC v. George & Leona Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

The Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department participated in a reality television program, The Shift. The film crew followed homicide detectives investigating a deadly 2008 home invasion. Police eventually arrested Hart, in the final episode of the program’s first season. After Hart spent nearly two years in jail awaiting trial, the charges were dismissed. The Shift’s audience was not informed. Hart sued detectives and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he was arrested without probable cause and that the lead detective made false or misleading statements in her probable cause affidavit for his arrest. The court rejected all claims before trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but noted “many troubling aspects of IMPD’s investigation, and this case should warn police departments about having their detectives moonlight as television stars.” A reasonable trier of fact could not find that police lacked probable cause to arrest Hart. Nor could a reasonable jury find that the lead detective made false or misleading statements in her affidavit. Four surviving witnesses from the home invasion separately identified Hart as one of the men who attacked them. None of the police had any reason to doubt these identifications when they arrested Hart. View "Hart v. Mannina" on Justia Law

The Foundation, the sole beneficiary of Ray Charles' estate, filed suit to challenge his heirs' purported termination of copyright grants that Charles conferred while he was alive. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the suit meets the threshold requirements of constitutional standing and ripeness, the argument that the Foundation may be a beneficial owner lends no support to its claim to standing; the Foundation is a real party in interest and has third-party standing; under the zone-of-interests test, the Foundation properly asserts its own claims where termination, if effective, would directly extinguish the Foundation’s right to receive prospective royalties from the current grant; and the Foundation is indeed a party whose injuries may have been proximately caused by violations of the statute. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "The Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Netflix under the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2710, and California Civil Code 1799.3, alleging that Netflix violated these statutes by permitting certain disclosures about their viewing history to third parties. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to plead a plausible violation of the VPPA because, as the court held, the disclosure alleged by plaintiffs is a disclosure “to the consumer” that is permitted by the Act. The fact that a subscriber may permit third parties to access her account, thereby allowing third parties to view Netflix’s disclosures, does not alter the legal status of those disclosures. As plaintiffs' complaint pleads only a lawful disclosure under the VPPA, the district court was correct to dismiss the first count of plaintiffs’ complaint. Likewise, plaintiffs failed to plead a violation of California Civil Code 1799.3. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. View "Mollett v. Netflix, Inc." on Justia Law

IPG, representative of several copyright owners in the 2000-03 royalty fee distribution proceeding, alleged that the Board erred in determining IPG's royalty fees in the sports programming and program suppliers categories. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the orders at issue are subject to judicial review as part of the Board’s final determination and therefore, the court has jurisdiction to review the merits of the appeal. The court concluded that an evidentiary sanction that the Board imposed during the preliminary evidentiary hearing is not arbitrary and capricious where the Board reasonably responded to a blatant discovery violation by IPG; no basis exists for overturning the Board’s reasoned decision to reject IPG’s sports programming claims on behalf of FIFA and the U.S. Olympic Committee; and the court rejected IPG's contentions that the Board improperly relied on the MPAA's methodology for calculating the relative marketplace value of their claims and allocating royalty fees within the program suppliers category. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Independent Producers Group v. Library of Congress" on Justia Law

Defendant, a film director, producer, and editor, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, a film production company, on its copyright and state-law claims related to the film entitled "Heads Up." At issue was whether a contributor to a creative work whose contributions are inseparable from, and integrated into, the work maintain a copyright interest in his or her contributions alone. Determining that the court had jurisdiction over the merits of the appeal, the court concluded that, on the facts of the present case, the Copyright Actʹs, 17 U.S.C. 102, terms, structure, and history support the conclusion that defendantʹs contributions to the film do not themselves constitute a ʺwork of authorshipʺ amenable to copyright protection. The court concluded that a directorʹs contribution to an integrated ʺwork of authorshipʺ such as a film is not itself a ʺwork of authorshipʺ subject to its own copyright protection. Therefore, defendant did not obtain and does not possess a copyright in his directorial contributions to the finished film. The court agreed with the district court that in this case, plaintiff was the dominant author of the film and concluded that plaintiff owns the copyright in the finished film and its prior versions, including the disputed ʺraw film footage.ʺ Finally, the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that defendant's interference with plaintiff's planned screening and post-screening reception constituted tortious interference under New York law. Rather, the court concluded that the undisputed material facts require judgment as a matter of law in defendantʹs favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions and for the district court to reexamine its award of costs and attorneyʹs fees, and for such other proceedings as are warranted. View "16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin" on Justia Law

Appellants Larry Savage, Richard Pellegrino, and Tucker Hobgood challenged a trial court’s validation of revenue bonds that will be used to help finance a new stadium in Cobb County for the Atlanta Braves major league baseball team. The bonds for the stadium project were to be issued pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement between Cobb County and the Cobb-Marietta Coliseum and Exhibit Hall Authority, under which the Authority agreed to issue bonds to cover much of the cost of constructing the stadium and the County agreed to pay amounts sufficient to cover the bond payments not covered by the licensing fees paid by the team. In consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that the intergovernmental contract was valid; that the issuance of the bonds would not violate the Georgia Constitution’s debt limitation clause, gratuities clause, or lending clause or Georgia’s revenue bond laws; and that the process used to validate the bonds was not deficient. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment validating the stadium project bonds. View "Savage v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Devin Copeland, a musician, filed suit under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq., against Justin Bieber and Usher Raymond IV, alleging that three recorded songs by defendants, each titled "Somebody to Love," infringe upon Copeland's copyright over his own, earlier song of the same name. On appeal, Copeland challenged the dismissal of his claim. The district court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Copeland's song and defendants' songs sufficiently similar to give rise to liability for infringement. At issue was whether the songs at issue, assessed from the perspective of the intended audience - here, the general public - and taking into account their “total concept and feel,” are sufficiently intrinsically similar to give rise to a valid infringement claim. After listening to the Copeland song and the Bieber and Usher songs as wholes, the court concluded that their choruses are similar enough and also significant enough that a reasonable jury could find the songs intrinsically similar. Further, the choruses of the Copeland song and the Bieber and Usher songs are sufficiently important to the songs’ overall effect that they may be the basis for a finding of intrinsic similarity. The court declined to reach Copeland’s other arguments. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Copeland v. Bieber" on Justia Law

The Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) received an anonymous tip that certain harness-racing drivers were fixing races in concert with known gamblers. At a hearing, the drivers asserted their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to answer questions. The state suspended their licenses to work in horse racing because for failure to comply with the conditions precedent for occupational licensing, as outlined in R431.1035, which provides that a license applicant, “shall cooperate in every way” during an investigation. The MGCB would not lift the exclusion orders unless the drivers answered questions without legal representation. The drivers unsuccessfully applied for 2011-2013 licenses, then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983; the district court granted MGCB summary judgment, finding that that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims for money damages against MGCB and its officials and that the MGCB was entitled to qualified immunity because the drivers failed to identify the violation of a constitutional right. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, but reversed with respect to due-process claims about the exclusions and self-incrimination claims, and remanded three issues: did the drivers request hearings on their exclusions, did their self-incrimination and due-process claims involve clearly established rights, and, if so, should an officer in the MGCB’s position have known about those rights? View "Moody v. Mich. Gaming Control Bd." on Justia Law