Justia Entertainment & Sports Law Opinion Summaries

Todd McNair, a former assistant football coach at the University of Southern California, sued the National Collegiate Athletic Association. The NCAA specially moved to strike plaintiff’s complaint on the ground the action was a strategic lawsuit against public participation (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16) and moved the court to seal certain records. Although the court denied the motion to seal, it conditionally sealed the documents pending appellate review. In connection with appeal from the denial of its special motion to strike, NCAA moved the court of appeal to seal the same documents lodged as part of the appellate record. The court denied the motion, noting the public’s First Amendment right of access to documents used at trial or as a basis of adjudication and a presumption of openness of substantive court proceedings in ordinary cases. To seal records, courts must find that there is an overriding interest supporting sealing records; there is a substantial probability that the interest will be prejudiced absent sealing; the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest; and there is no less restrictive means of achieving that interest. NCAA failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that its interest in the confidentiality of its enforcement proceedings overrides the constitutional right of access and the presumption of openness, or how that interest would be prejudiced if the documents were disclosed. View "McNair v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Ass'n" on Justia Law

AEG hired Dr. Murray as entertainer Michael Jackson’s personal physician for a concert tour. Michael died of acute propofol intoxication while under Murray’s care. Katherine Jackson, on behalf of herself and as guardian of Michael’s children, Michael Jr., Paris-Michael and Prince Michael, filed suit for negligence hiring, retention, and supervision. The jury found that Murray was not unfit or incompetent to perform the work for which he was hired. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in summarily adjudicating negligence because AEG did not owe Michael a duty to refrain from exerting pressure over Murray; AEG did not undertake to provide protective services to Michael; and AEG owed Michael no duty arising out of the contract with Murray. The court also did not err in summarily adjudicating respondeat superior because the undisputed facts establish that Murray was an independent contractor as a matter of law; AEG is not liable under the peculiar risk doctrine as an independent contractor; and Murray was not an agent of AEG. The trial court did not err in instructing the jurors with a modified jury instruction along with the special verdict form; the special verdict was legally sufficient. View "Jackson v. AEG Live, LLC" on Justia Law

MVH and Holy Family Communications each applied to the Federal Communications Commission for a license to operate a noncommercial educational radio station in the vicinity of Buffalo, New York. To do so, the agency used its comparative selection criteria, which it had promulgated through a notice-and-comment rulemaking. By application of those criteria, the Commission found Holy Family had the superior application and awarded it the license. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the criterion upon which the outcome turned--the weight given to an applicant’s plan to broadcast to underserved populations-- either violated the Communications Act of 1934, which requires the Commission to distribute licenses fairly, or was arbitrary and capricious. That criterion is part of a reasonable framework for achieving goals consistent with the Commission’s statutory mandate, and because MVH offered no support for a waiver except that it came close to the threshold it needed to get the license. View "Mary V. Harris Found. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n" on Justia Law

This case arose when the Oakland Athletics wanted to move to the City of San Jose, but the City falls within the exclusive operating territory of the San Francisco Giants. The City, seeking approval of the move, filed suit against MLB, alleging violations of state and federal antitrust laws, of California's consumer protection statute, and of California tort law. The district court granted MLB's motion to dismiss on all but the tort claims and the City appealed. The City argues that the baseball industry's historic exemption from the antitrust laws does not apply to antitrust claims relating to franchise relocation. The court held, however, that antitrust claims against MLB's franchise relocation policies are precluded by Flood v. Kuhn, and, under Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v Kuhn, the court rejected any antitrust claim that was wholly unrelated to the reserve clause. Therefore, the City's claims under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 1-7 and 15 U.S.C. 12-27, must be dismissed. Further, the City's antitrust claims necessarily fall with its federal claims where the City can point to no case that has ever held that state antitrust claims continue to be viable after federal antitrust claims have been dismissed under the baseball exemption. An independent claim under California's unfair competition law is also barred so long as MLB's activities are lawful under the antitrust laws. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "City of San Jose v. Comm'r of Baseball" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against EA, alleging that Madden NFL, a series of video games, includes accurate likenesses of plaintiffs without authorization, as well as roughly 6,000 other former NFL players who appear on more than 100 historic teams in various editions of Madden NFL. EA moved to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion where EA has not shown a probability of prevailing on its incidental use defense and its other defenses are effectively precluded by the court's decision in Keller v. Elec. Arts. In this case, EA has not shown that the transformative use defense applies to plaintiffs' claims; EA has not established a probability of prevailing on either the common law public interest defense or the "public affairs" exemption of California Civil Code 3344(d); the Rogers v. Grimaldi test does not apply to plaintiffs' right-of-publicity claims; and EA has not established a probability of prevailing on its incidental use defense. View "Davis v. Electronic Arts" on Justia Law

Thousands of retired professional football players sued the National Football League and other defendants alleging primarily that the defendants failed to take reasonable actions to protect players from the risks associated with concussive and sub-concussive head injuries. The cases were consolidated and the district court “preliminarily approved” a proposed class-action settlement agreement and “conditionally certified for settlement purposes only” the settlement class and subclasses. Seven retired professional football players who object to the proposed settlement agreement and class certification, filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) petition for permission to appeal. The Third Circuit dismissed finding that the order was not an “order granting or denying class-action certification” under the plain text of the rule permitting interlocutory review. View "In re: NFL Players Concussion Injury Litigation" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from litigation regarding the ownership of the composition copyright to the song Whoomp! (There It Is), writen and produced by Tag Team. The district court concluded that plaintiff owned the copyright and DM Records was liable for copyright infringement, and the jury awarded $2 million in damages. DM Records appealed on several grounds. In regards to DM Record's arguments related to the district court's interpretation of the Recording Agreement as assigning a single fifty percent interest to Alvert Music, the court concluded that none of the pieces of allegedly conflicting evidence cited by DM Records presents a factual issue, and Bellmark Records waived its right to bring a Rule 50(b) motion by not raising its second argument at trial. In regards to DM Records' challenge to the district court's denial of its Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment based on fraud and lack of standing, DM Records is not entitled to Rule 60(b) relief on the basis of the allegedly withheld Security Agreement because standing is determined at the time of suit and the 2006 Security Agreement does not establish that plaintiff did not own the copyright in 2002 when he commenced the suit. The court also concluded that the district court did not plainly err in instructing the jury and that the jury could have determined that plaintiff was properly awarded 100 percent of the royalties from which it could pay Tag Team its share. Finally, it was not plain error for the district court to allow plaintiff's closing statement and not to grant DM's motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Isbell v. DM Records, Inc." on Justia Law

“Musical work” and the owner’s exclusive right to perform the work in public are protected by 17 U.S.C. 106(4). Broadcast of a musical work is a performance and requires a license from the copyright owner. Copyright Act amendments afford the copyright owner of a sound recording “the narrow but exclusive right ‘to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.’” The law requires “certain digital music services . . . to pay recording companies and recording artists when they transmit[] sound recordings” and provides for appointment of three Copyright Royalty Judges. If sound recording copyrights owners are unable to negotiate a royalty with digital music services, the Judges may set reasonable rates and terms. The Judges set royalty rates and defined terms for statutorily defined satellite digital audio radio services (SDARS) and preexisting subscription services (PSS). SoundExchange, which collects and distributes royalties to copyright owners, argued that the Judges set rates too low and erred in defining “Gross Revenues” and eligible deductions for SDARS. A PSS that provides music-only television channels appealed, arguing that PSS rates were set too high. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Judges of the Board acted within their broad discretion and on a sufficient record. View "Music Choice v. Copyright Royalty Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the enforcement of the County of Los Angeles Safer Sex in the Adult Film Industry Act ("Measure B"), Los Angeles County, Cal. Code tit. 11, div. 1, ch. 11.39, and amending tit. 22, div. 1, ch. 22.56.1925. Measure B imposes a permitting system and additional production obligations on the makers of adult films, such as requiring performers to wear condoms in certain contexts. The court concluded that it need not decide whether Intervenors satisfy the requirements of Article III standing where plaintiffs have standing. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting preliminary injunctive relief to only certain parts of Measure B, while allowing enforcement of other provisions as severable. The purpose of Measure B is twofold: (1) to decrease the spread of sexually transmitted infections among performers within the adult industry, (2) thereby stemming the transmission of sexually transmitted infections to the general population among whom the performers dwell. The court concluded that the district court properly exercised its discretion in concluding that the condom requirement would likely survive intermediate scrutiny where the restriction of expression in this case is de minimus; the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest; and the condom requirement leaves alternative channels of expression available. The portions of Measure B's permitting system left in place by the district court also survives constitutional scrutiny where the requirements that adult film producers complete training about blood-borne pathogens and post a permit during shooting still serve the County's interest in preventing sexually transmitted infections. The district court correctly concluded that the remaining permitting provisions leave little, if any, discretion to government officials. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction with respect to the condom and permitting requirement. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Vivid Entertainment v. Fielding" on Justia Law

Kenneth Wynne and Allison Wynne owned and operated Wynne Fine Art, which accepted art works from creditor artists. After the Wynnes filed for bankruptcy, the trustee of the bankruptcy estates moved to sell the art works. The creditor artists commenced an adversary proceeding against the bankruptcy estate seeking a declaration that the art works were held in trust under the Massachusetts fine art consignment statute, Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 104A, 2(b), and therefore were not the property of the bankruptcy estates. The trustee counterclaimed seeking a declaration that chapter 104A was inapplicable because when the creditor artists delivered their work to the gallery they did not provide a written statement describing the art work as required by chapter 104A, section 2(b). The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts certified a question of law to the Supreme Judicial Court concerning the effect of a consignor’s failure to deliver a written statement pursuant to chapter 104A, section 2(b). The Supreme Judicial Court answered that a written statement of delivery is not a prerequisite for the formation of a consignment under chapter 104A. View "Plumb v. Casey" on Justia Law