Justia Entertainment & Sports Law Opinion Summaries

Clinton is a musician, bandleader, and touring performance artist. H&L, a law firm, represented Clinton in in 2005-2008, billed Clinton $3,341,650, received $1,000,578 in payment, and wrote off $600,000 of the remaining balance. This left $1,779,756.29 due. H&L initiated arbitration. Clinton did not participate; the panel ruled in favor of H&L. The district court confirmed the award of $1,675,639.82, plus interest plus $60,786.50 in attorney fees. H&L pursued collection, including garnishments, levies, and liens across the country. Clinton’s attorney declared that they created a financial “stranglehold” so that Clinton “[c]an’t pay his taxes … it is going to affect... his ability to make a living at 72 years old.” A year later, Clinton sued H&L for legal malpractice. H&L asserted counterclaims and sought an order authorizing the sale of master sound recording copyrights to satisfy its judgments. The district court appointed a receiver and authorized the receiver to use the copyrights to satisfy the judgments. Amending its earlier order, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Under Washington law Clinton’s copyrights in the masters were subject to execution to satisfy judgments against him. Section 201(e) of the federal Copyright Act does not protect Clinton from the involuntary transfer of his copyrighted works. Clinton could raise claims of fraud on the court and judicial estoppel for the first time on appeal, but the claims were meritless.View "Hendricks & Lewis PLLC v. Clinton" on Justia Law

Fortres develops and sells a desktop management program called “Clean Slate” and holds a federally-registered trademark for use of that name to identify “[c]omputer software used to protect public access computers by scouring the computer drive back to its original configuration upon reboot.” When Warner Bros. Entertainment used the words “the clean slate” to describe a hacking program in the movie, The Dark Knight Rises, Fortres experienced a precipitous drop in sales of its software. Fortres sued, alleging that the use of the words “clean slate” in reference to the software in its movie infringed its trademark in violation of Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114, 1125, and Indiana unfair competition law. The district court dismissed, reasoning that Fortres had not alleged a plausible theory of consumer confusion, upon which all of its claims depend, and that Warner Bros.’ use of the words “the clean slate” was protected by the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed without reaching the constitutional question. Juxtaposed against the weakness of all the other relevant factors, the similarity of the marks is not enough to establish confusion. Trademark law protects the source-denoting function of words used in conjunction with goods and services, not the words themselves.View "Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc." on Justia Law

VICI, a sports car racing team, sought T-Mobile’s sponsorship for the 2009-2011 Le Mans racing seasons. The companies entered into an agreement that required VICI to field one T-Mobile-sponsored racecar during the 2009 season and two during each of the 2010 and 2011 seasons and required VICI to display T- Mobile’s logo. The agreement provides that “VICI grants to [T-Mobile] the right to be the exclusive wireless carrier supplying wireless connectivity for the Porsche, Audi and VW telematics programs.” The Agreement had a force majeure clause, a severability clause, and a “Limitation of Liabilities.” VICI worked with T-Mobile to secure telematics business from VW, Audi, and Porsche. In July 2009, T-Mobile’s sponsored racecar sustained damage from an accident and was not able to race while undergoing repairs. On January 5, 2010, VICI sent a notice of default, indicating that T-Mobile had failed to pay $7 million due under the agreement. On January 7, T-Mobile sent a letter terminating the Agreement, stating that VICI made a material representation that VICI had authority to bind Audi, VW and that VICI failed, without justification or notice, to race at a key event where T-Mobile hosted business guests. The district court awarded VICI $7 million in damages. The Third Circuit affirmed the award of $7, but vacated with regard to VICI’s damages resulting from T- Mobile’s failure to make the 2011 payment. On remand, the court should consider an award of attorney’s fees to VICI in light of its reassessment of the 2011 damages issue. View "VICI Racing LLC v. T-Mobile USA Inc." on Justia Law

Debtor, a managing member of Twister's Iron Horse Saloon, appealed the bankruptcy court's order determining that a debt arising from a civil judgment in favor of appellees for copyright infringement was excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6). Some of the music played or performed at Twister's was in the repertoire of the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP). Appellees granted ASCAP a nonexclusive right to license public performance rights of their works. Twister's did not hold a public performance license. In this case, the court agreed with the bankruptcy court that debtor had willfully failed to obtain an ASCAP license and maliciously disregarded the rights of ASCAP's members and Federal copyright law. Therefore, the debt was excepted from discharge and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sailor Music, et al. v. Walker" on Justia Law

Musical artist George Clinton appealed the district court's order appointing a receiver and authorizing the sale of copyrights in an action against his former law firm. The firm obtained judgments against Clinton for past-due attorneys' fees and sought an order authorizing the sale of master recordings that Clinton recorded with the group Funkadelic (the "Masters") to satisfy the judgments. The court concluded that Clinton's copyrights in the Masters were subject to execution to satisfy judgments entered against him; Section 201(e) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 201(e), does not protect Clinton from the involuntary transfer of his copyrighted works; the district court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a receiver to manage or sell ownership of these copyrights; Clinton may raise claims of fraud on the court and judicial estoppel for the first time on appeal, but both claims are meritless; and Clinton failed to raise his preemption, Erie Doctrine, and Due Process Arguments in the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hendricks & Lewis PLLC v. Clinton" on Justia Law

In 1993, a class of plaintiffs represented by Reggie White settled a lawsuit with the NFL by signing an extensive collective bargaining agreement (the SSA), that governed labor relations between the NFL and its players. In 2011, the Association filed suit against the NFL, asserting that the NFL had violated the SSA in 2010 by instituting a secret cap on player salaries. The suit was settled and the Association now seeks to set aside the Stipulation of Dismissal and reopen its breach-of-SSA claim. Because the White class never asserted any of the claims settled in the dismissal, because these claims did not arise from a bargained-for class settlement, because the parties themselves have never treated the SSA like a class settlement, and because only a handful of the White class members were affected by the dismissal, the court concluded that the failure of the district court and the litigants to abide by the class settlement procedures of Rule 23(e) did not invalidate the dismissal. The court agreed with its sister circuits that have held that a stipulated dismissal constitutes a "judgment" under Rule 60(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's Rule 23 ruling, reversed the district court's Rule 60 ruling, and remanded for further proceedings. View "White, et al. v. National Football League, et al." on Justia Law

Rafters Bar and Grill, a golf-course restaurant in Canton, Ohio, offers music and dancing, sometimes turning on a recording, sometimes bringing in live performers, but it hosts performances of the music without getting the copyright owners’ permission. BMI, an organization of songwriters and composers that licenses music and collects royalties on behalf of its members, sent Rafters more than a score of letters, warning the restaurant not to infringe its copyrights and offering to license its music. It got no response. BMI sued for copyright infringement. Roy, the owner of Rafters, argued that he did not perform any of the copyrighted music. The bands that played at the restaurant and the people who turned on the recordings did that. The district court granted BMI summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that a defendant becomes vicariously liable for a direct infringement of a copyright “by profiting from [the] infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.” A defendant’s ignorance about the infringement or the performances does not negate vicarious liability. View "Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Meadowlake Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a baseball bat manufacturer, filed an antitrust suit against the NCAA and the NFHS, alleging that they imposed a regulation, the Bat-Ball Coefficient of Restitution Standard (BBCOR), that restrained trade in the market for non-wood baseball bats. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege a conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; the only plausible injury asserted was its own and only injuries to the markets were cognizable; and therefore, plaintiff did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted and the district court properly dismissed its Sherman Act claim. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion to amend where two prior amendments were granted and allowing a third would be futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint and affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend. View "Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athl. Assn., et al." on Justia Law

Michael Queen, an NBC Employee, claimed an entitlement to a portion of Ed Schultz's income from the "The Ed Show" on MSNBC based on their alleged agreement to co-develop a show. Queen sued Schultz in district court, and Schultz counterclaimed against Queen for fraud, slander, and liable. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled that neither Queen nor Schultz was liable to the other for anything. Queen appealed. The court concluded that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Schultz on Queen's claim that he, Max Schindler, and Schultz entered into an enforceable contract to divide the profits from a potential television show 50/25/25. However, the court concluded that there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Queen and Schultz formed a partnership to develop a television show and, if so, whether Schultz was liable to Queen for breach of partnership duties. Therefore, the court reversed that portion of the district court's judgment and remanded to enable Queen to present his partnership theory to a jury. View "Queen v. Schultz" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court started from an agreement between Respondents, the University of South Carolina and the University Gamecock Club, and Appellant George M. Lee, III. In exchange for Appellant purchasing a $100,000 life insurance policy and naming the University the sole, irrevocable beneficiary of the policy, Appellant was given the "opportunity to purchase tickets" for his lifetime to University football and basketball games. Years later, the University instituted a program that required all Gamecock Club members, including Appellant, to pay a seat license fee as a prerequisite for purchasing season tickets. Believing that the University could not require him to pay additional consideration for the opportunity to purchase tickets without violating the agreement, Appellant brought a declaratory judgment action. The trial court entered judgment for the University and the Gamecock Club, finding that Appellant was not deprived of the opportunity to purchase season tickets when the University instituted the seat license fees. The Supreme Court reversed: the Agreement unambiguously prohibited the University from requiring Lee to pay the seat license fee as a prerequisite for the opportunity to purchase tickets pursuant to the Agreement. View "Lee v. University of South Carolina" on Justia Law