Justia Entertainment & Sports Law Opinion Summaries
600 Marshall Entm’t Concepts, LLC v. City of Memphis
The Memphis nightclub is located in a zoning district where adult entertainment has been prohibited since 1993. Although already allowed to present most forms of adult entertainment under a grandfather clause, the club desires to present adult entertainment in the form of compensated nude dancers and claims that an ordinance requiring a permit to present nude dancers is unconstitutional as an improper prior restraint and as vague. The club claims that a city official’s actions violated its procedural due process rights. Following a remand, the district court rejected its suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the club had forfeited its prior restraint argument, had not established vagueness, and had not established that it was deprived of a protected property or liberty interest when its dance permit was revoked and not reissued. View "600 Marshall Entm't Concepts, LLC v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Entertainment & Sports Law
Mattel, Inc., et al v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., et al
Mattel filed suit against MGA, claiming that MGA infringed Mattel's copyrights by producing Bratz dolls. On appeal, Mattel challenged the jury's verdict that Mattel misappropriated MGA's trade secrets and the district court's award of attorneys fees and costs to MGA under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 505. The court held that MGA's claim of trade-secret misappropriation was not logically related to Mattel's counterclaim and therefore, the court reversed the district court's holding that MGA's counterclaim-in-reply was compulsory. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees and costs under the Act, the court affirmed that award. View "Mattel, Inc., et al v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., et al" on Justia Law
Bogie v. Rosenberg
Bogie attended a comedy show featuring Joan Rivers, who told a joke about Helen Keller, offending an audience member who had a deaf son. The audience member heckled Rivers; their brief exchange was filmed and was part of the documentary. When Rivers exited to a backstage area, closed to the public, Bogie gained entry and expressed frustration with the heckler and sympathy for Rivers. Rivers responded with an expression of sympathy for the heckler. The film shows at least three others present. The interaction was filmed and included in the documentary entitled Joan Rivers: A Piece of Work. Bogie’s conversation lasted 16 seconds in the film’s 82 minutes, 0.3 percent of the entire film. The documentary was distributed nationwide. Bogie alleges that she was portrayed in the film as having approved of condescending and disparaging remarks by Rivers toward Wisconsin, its citizens, and the heckler. Bogie’s complaint alleged that her privacy was invaded by the distribution of the film and that the film misappropriated her image for commercial purposes without her consent. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the footage was “incidental,” newsworthy, and not used for advertising. View "Bogie v. Rosenberg" on Justia Law
GameFly, Inc. v. PRC
GameFly filed a complaint under 39 U.S.C. 3662(a) with the Commission accusing the Postal Service of providing preferential rates and terms of service to Netflix in violation of 39 U.S.C. 403(c). When the Commission properly finds that discrimination has occurred, it is obligated to remedy that discrimination, even if it concludes that none of the parties' proposed remedies is appropriate. The court held that, in this case, even if the Commission's rejection of GameFly's proposed remedies was reasonable, its order was still arbitrary and capricious because it left discrimination in place without reasonable explanation. Therefore, the court vacated the Commission's order and remanded the case for an adequate remedy. Accordingly, the court granted GameFly's petition for review. View "GameFly, Inc. v. PRC" on Justia Law
DC Comics v. Pacific Pictures Corp., et al
This case arose from a dispute over the character Superman that Jerome Siegel and Joseph Shuster jointly created and thereafter gave rights to DC Comic's predecessor. Defendants appealed the district court's denial of defendants' motion, pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16, to strike certain of DC Comics' state law claims. At issue was whether the court's decision in Batzel v. Smith remained good law after the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter. In Batzel, the court held that the collateral order doctrine permitted a party to take an interlocutory appeal of an order denying motions to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. The court held that such motions remained among the class of orders for which an immediate appeal was available. Thus, the holding in Batzel remained good law and the order denying the motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute remained immediately appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. Therefore, the court had jurisdiction and decided the merits in a memorandum disposition filed concurrently. View "DC Comics v. Pacific Pictures Corp., et al" on Justia Law
Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Disney Enters., Inc.
In 1930, A.A. Milne transferred to Slesinger exclusive merchandising and other rights to Winnie-the-Pooh works in the U.S. and Canada. In 1961, Slesinger exclusively “assigned, granted, and set over to” Disney the rights in the 1930 agreement. A 1983 agreement sought to resolve the parties’ disputes, but Slesinger contends it retained rights in the works, while Disney maintains Slesinger assigned all rights. In 1991, before the present litigation, Slesinger sued in state court, alleging breach of the 1983 agreement. Slesinger acknowledged that the 1983 agreement “regranted, licensed and assigned all rights” to Disney. The action was ultimately dismissed. The dispute continued in federal court. The district court dismissed, noting that the parties’ actions indicated the rights were transferred to Disney in the 1983 agreement. Between 1983 and 2006, Disney registered at least 15 trademarks. In 2004, Disney registered copyrights in 45 works and renewed copyright registrations for another 14. Slesinger did not attempt to perfect or register trademarks or copyrights before asserting its federal claims and never objected to Disney’s registrations until 2006, when the state court dismissed its claims and Slesinger attempted to cancel Disney’s applications and marks. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s dismissal, citing estoppel. View "Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Disney Enters., Inc." on Justia Law
In re: Fox
In 2001 Fox sought to register a mark having a literal element, consisting of the words COCK SUCKER, and a design element, consisting of a drawing of a crowing rooster. Since 1979, Fox has used this mark to sell rooster-shaped chocolate lollipops, which she “displays . . .in retail outlets in small replicas of egg farm collecting baskets to emphasize the country farmyard motif.” The consumers targeted by Fox’s business are, primarily, fans of teams that have gamecocks as mascots. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed refusal by the examiner to register her mark, citing 15 U.S.C. 1052(a). The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that a mark that creates a double entendre falls within the proscription of the section where, as here, one of its meanings is clearly vulgar. The section’s prohibition on registration of “immoral ... or scandalous matter” includes a mark that is “vulgar.”View "In re: Fox" on Justia Law
Remark, LLC v. Adell Broad. Corp.
Remark produced a distinctive series of television commercials for radio stations known as the “remarkable mouth” or “hot lips” commercials. The U.S. Copyright Office issued a copyright for a version of this commercial in 1980. The original holder of the copyright assigned it to Remark, which registered it with the Copyright Office in 2002. WADL, a Detroit television station, broadcast two commercials that resemble the copyright. After the commercials aired, Remark sent a cease-and-desist letter to the producer, Adell. After some negotiation, the parties agreed that $50,000 would settle Remark’s claims. Remark drafted an agreement, and Adell produced a revised version. Remark’s counsel e-mailed Adell’s counsel saying that Remark agreed to the changes. Adell forwarded a final version. Remark signed and returned the originals, but Adell never signed the agreement. It instead retained new counsel and for the first time balked at the $50,000 figure, offering to settle for a more “reasonable” amount. Remark filed suit. The district court granted Remark summary judgment but denied its request for attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Remark, LLC v. Adell Broad. Corp." on Justia Law
Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken Communications LLC, et al
Retro Television Network appealed the district court's dismissal of its claims against appellees, Luken and Retro Television, under Rule 12(b)(6). In 2005, Equity entered into an intellectual property agreement (IPA) with Retro Television Network. Retro Television Network subsequently sued appellees seeking royalty payments and an accounting under the IPA. Because Retro Television Network failed to allege any facts that would make Luken liable for Equity's obligations under the IPA, the district court properly dismissed its claims against Luken. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees. View "Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken Communications LLC, et al" on Justia Law
Miller v. AXA Winterthur Ins. Co.
In 2000 an “incident” occurred on the ice of a professional hockey game in Switzerland between Miller and McKim. McKim was injured. Swiss courts filed criminal charges against Miller. McKim’s insurer and hockey club filed suit against Miller, and two civil judgments were entered against Miller. Miller left Switzerland before the judgments were finalized and informed his hockey team and its insurer (Winterthur) that he no longer had the financial means to defend the litigation. In 2005, a document was submitted to Miller in Michigan from Winterthur that acknowledged its responsibility for the costs of criminal and civil judgments and proceedings pending in Zurich and previous attorneys’ fees. In 2010, McKim’s team and insurer submitted demands for payment to Miller from the Swiss judgment. Miller, claiming reliance, submitted the demands to Winterthur, which declined to pay the judgments in full. Miller brought suit in Michigan, seeking contractual damages and enforcement of the terms of the 2005 document. The district court granted Winterthur’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Miller had established a basis for personal jurisdiction under Michigan’s long-arm statute, but the requirements of constitutional due process were not met. View "Miller v. AXA Winterthur Ins. Co." on Justia Law